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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2643 
___________ 
 
SHOU YUN JIN, 
Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. 094-803-216) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Shou Yun Jin petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Jin, a native of China, entered the United States without inspection in September 
2006.  He was charged as removable for entering without a valid entry document.  Jin 
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conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had been persecuted in the past 
under China’s family planning policy and that he had a well-founded fear of persecution 
based on his religion. 
 After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Jin not credible and denied relief.  
The IJ observed that Jin’s allegations of persecution based on his Catholicism were not 
supported by the State Department’s reports on country conditions and that Jin had not 
mentioned any raid on his underground church until his merits hearing.  The IJ pointed 
out that Jin’s family continued to practice Catholicism in China without problems.  Jin 
appealed to the BIA. 
 The BIA dismissed the appeal.  It noted that Jin did not challenge the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination and concluded that it was not clearly erroneous.  The BIA 
agreed with the IJ that one incident of a church service being disrupted did not amount to 
persecution.  As for Jin’s CAT claim, the BIA determined that he had not made any 
meaningful arguments on appeal for that relief and had not shown he was entitled to such.  
Jin filed a petition for review.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We may not reverse the BIA’s 
decision unless the record evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude 
that Jin had met his burden.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  In his 
brief, Jin does not dispute the lack of evidence in support of his family planning claim.  
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He argues that he has demonstrated a well-found fear of future persecution based on his 
religion.     
 Jin contends that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was clearly erroneous.  
However, we do not review the adverse credibility determination for clear error.  We 
must uphold the adverse credibility finding unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.  Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 In finding Jin not credible, the IJ noted that he had not mentioned his presence at 
the church raid in any of his previous statements.  Jin contends that the IJ ignored 
corroborating evidence that:  (1) Jin’s sister was in hiding to avoid arrest for attending the 
underground church; (2) fellow church members stated that conditions had worsened; and 
(3) Jin’s uncle stated that local cadres wanted to arrest Jin for his participation in the 
underground church.  However, the IJ did discuss this evidence.  She noted:  (1) Jin’s 
siblings are practicing Catholics and have not had any problems in China; (2) Jin’s sister  
related to him that underground church members were arrested and she ran away for 
several days; (3) two of Jin’s fellow church congregants had advised that their church had 
been detected by the Chinese government; and (4) Jin’s uncle stated that the government 
wanted to arrest Jin but that the uncle had failed to mention the raid on Jin’s church.  The 
IJ stated that there was no evidence that officials sought to arrest Jin at the time of the 
raid or before he left China a year later.  Contrary to Jin’s argument, the IJ did not ignore 
his evidence. 
4 
 
 The BIA observed that Jin did not challenge the IJ’s adverse credibility finding 
and stated that it was not persuaded that the adverse credibility finding was erroneous.  
To the extent that the BIA’s statement is sufficient to consider Jin’s current challenge to 
be exhausted, see Lin v. Attorney General, 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008), Jin has 
not shown that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find him credible.    
 The BIA agreed with the IJ that Jin could not meet his burden of proof even if he 
were credible.  Jin argues that the BIA erred in making this determination and cites to the 
State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report on China from 2008.  Jin 
points to a statement that unregistered believers were forced to renounce ordinations 
approved by the Vatican or face punishments such as fines, loss of jobs, detentions, and 
their children being barred from school.  The Report stated that the officials scrutinize 
and sometimes harass unregistered religious groups.  However, Jin does not explain how 
this would rise to the level of persecution.  See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“Abusive treatment and harassment, while always deplorable, may not 
rise to the level of persecution.”)  Moreover, the Report indicates that most of the 
harassment is directed towards underground clergy and bishops.  In light of the evidence 
that Jin lived in China without incident after the church raid in May 2005 until he left 
China in August 2006, and that his Catholic family members have had no problems, these 
excerpts from the State Department Reports do not compel a finding that Jin has a well-
founded fear of future persecution. 
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 Jin also argues that he is entitled to withholding of removal for the same reasons 
he is entitled to asylum.  Because he has not met his burden for asylum, he also has not 
met the higher standard for withholding of removal.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 
157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Jin further contends that he is entitled to relief under the CAT.  
He points to a statement in a State Department Report that underground believers were 
among those held and abused in mental institutions.  However, Jin has not shown that the 
record compels a finding that it is more likely than not that he will be housed in such an 
institution.   
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
